Much recent discussion in computing journals has been devoted to arguments about the feasibility and usefulness of formal verification methods. Too little attention has been given to precise criticism of specific proposed systems for reasoning about programs. Whether such systems are to be used for formal verification, by hand or automatically, or as a rigorous foundation for informal reasoning, it is essential that they be logically sound. Several popular rules in the Hoare language are, in fact, not sound. These rules have been accepted because they have not been subjected to sufficiently strong standards of correctness. This paper attempts to clarify the different technical definitions of correctness of a logic, to show that only the strongest of these definitions is acceptable for Hoare logic, and to correct some of the unsound rules that have appeared in the literature. The corrected rules are given merely to show that it is possible to do so. Convenient and elegant rules for reasoning about certain programming constructs will probably require a more flexible notation than Hoare's.
Logic is the study of the relation between a symbolic language and its meaning, with special emphasis on the legitimate ways of reasoning in the language. A primary accomplishment of mathematical logic in the earlier part of this century was the formalization of the first-order predicate calculus, a logical language that is generally regarded as sufficient in principle for nearly all mathematical discourse. Formal rules for reasoning in the firstorder predicate calculus have been shown to be correct and powerful enough to derive all true theorems of this language. In the last decade, new languages and formal rules for reasoning about programs have been proposed and attempts have been made to justify the correctness of these rules.
A particularly popular language for reasoning about programs is the language of Hoare triples [15] . The Hoare language includes the formulas of the first-order predicate calculus plus triples of the form A {P}B, with A and B predicate calculus formulas and P a program or part of a program. Such a triple is intended to mean that if the initial state of a machine satisfies the assertion A, then after running the program P, B must be true of the final state. Unfortunately, several different definitions of the correctness of a system of reasoning, which are equivalent for the predicate calculus, are not equivalent for the Hoare language. We must be very careful when studying rules for reasoning in the Hoare language to use a criterion for correctness that corresponds to our intuitive idea of legitimate reasoning. Several articles on Hoare logic in the past few years [6, 18, 21] have attempted to justify rules of reasoning by criteria that are insufficient to give intuitive confidence in the derivations that are carried out by such rules.
There are three main reasons for using a formal presentation of logic instead of relying solely on intuition when reading and writing technical arguments.
(1) A formal presentation provides a uniform standard which may be used as a final authority in disagreements.
(2) Formal presentation makes a system of reasoning into a mathematical object which may be studied objectively to discover its properties.
(3) A formally presented system may be processed automatically by computers.
To be useful for any of these three purposes, a formal system must be intuitively correct. A common enterprise in logic is to formalize the notion of correctness and to prove that a formal system is correct. Along with such a proof, a careful intuitive inspection of the formal definition of correctness is essential, since everything hinges on this definition. Such careful scrutiny has generally been omitted in published work on Hoare logics. The purpose of this paper is to begin such scrutiny. It will be shown that several proposed rules for reasoning about programs have been judged by faulty standards of cor-rectness and are, in fact, incorrect by the proper standards.
Section 2 describes four different technical definitions of correctness and argues that only the strongest of these definitions is intuitively sufficient. Section 3 introduces the Hoare language and its meaning. Section 4 shows the well-known correct rules for reasoning about programs with assignments, conditionals, and while loops. Section 4 extends the rules to handle programs with function definitions. The first two published attempts to give rules for function definitions [6, 18, 21] were incorrect. Section 5 discusses the problems of reasoning about programs with Goto commands. The best known rule for reasoning about Gotos [6] is also incorrect, although it satisfies a weaker condition that is sometimes mistaken for correctness.
Criteria for Correctness of a Logical System
Two primary requirements are known for the correctness of a system of reasoning, each with several variations in its technical definitions. Consistency refers to the inability of a system to derive an explicit contradiction, while the stronger notion of soundness says that everything derived in a system is in some sense true. There are two natural definitions of consistency.
Definitions
Assume that a relation contradictory(~) has been defined on Finite sets • of formulas in a language so that contradictory(~b) captures the intuitive notion that the formulas in • are explicitly mutually contradictory.
A logical system of reasoning is strongly consistent if it is not possible to prove all of the formulas in a set • such that
contradictory(alP).
A logical system of reasoning is weakly consistent if it is not possible to prove a single formula F such that contradictory ((F) 
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For some reasonable definition of contradictory, strong consistency is intuitively a necessary condition for the correctness of a logical system, but it is not, in general, a sufficient condition since a system might prove a formula that is false but does not contradict any other provable formula.
Definitions
A set of formulas • implies a formula F if F is true in every world in which all the formulas in ~ are true.
A logical system is theorem sound if every provable formula is true in every world.
A logical system is inferentially sound if for every set of formulas • and every formula F, if F can be proved from assumptions in ~, then ~ implies F.
In any system where contradictory formulas cannot all be true in the same world, theorem soundness implies strong consistency. In every case, inferential soundness implies theorem soundness. Inferential soundness may be applied to a single rule of inference as well as to a logical system, treating the rule as a system composed of one rule.
Definition
A rule of inference R is inferentially sound if whenever the set of hypotheses ~ yields the conclusion F by rule R, ~ implies F.
By a straightforward induction, a logical system is inferentially sound if and only if its axioms are true in every world and its rules of inference are inferentially sound.
In the first-order predicate calculus, F is provable from assumptions in ~ if and only if there is some finite subset {F1, ..-, F, 0 of~ such that ((FI& ... &Fn) F) is provable with no assumptions. Since the meaning of the implication symbol is just that the left side implies the right side, theorem and inferential soundness are equivalent for the first-order predicate calculus. In Hoare logic, it is not always possible to join two formulas with an implication sign, so theorem soundness may be weaker than inferential soundness.
Although theorem soundness seems at first glance to be enough for an intuitive claim of correctness, this weaker form of soundness only justifies the theorems of a system, not the methods of reasoning. If a formal system is to provide a satisfactory foundation for actual reasoning, the methods of proof should be intuitively correct, not just symbol manipulation tricks that fortuitously produce true theorems at the end. One might argue that certain rules for program verification are intended only for automatic theorem proving, not for human consumption, so that the steps of reasoning are not important as long as the answer is right. Even from such a restricted point of view, theorem soundness is at best not a very robust notion.
Suppose that a certain logical system is incomplete, so that some particular true formula F cannot be proved. Such a system might be theorem sound, yet the assump-tion F might lead to a proof of some false or even contradictory formula G. Any attempt to extend this system by adding true formulas as axioms or by providing additional correct rules of inference would be very dangerous, since once the true formula F became provable, so would the false formula G. It is shown in Sec. 6 that the rules for reasoning about Goto commands proposed by Clint and Hoare [6] create a system of reasoning with this dangerous property: because of the lack of inferential soundness, the addition of true axioms yields an inconsistency. Arbib and Alagi6 [1, 3] also noticed a problem with the Clint and Hoare Goto rule. In inferentially sound systems, every step of reasoning is correct, so soundness is preserved when additional true axioms or additional sound rules are added.
Meanings of Formulas in Hoare Logics
Recall that a Hoare formula is either a formula of the first-order predicate calculus or a triple A {P}B with A and B formulas of the predicate calculus and P a program or program segment (some people prefer to write {A}P{B}). Predicate calculus formulas are built from function, constant and variable symbols, relational symbols, the equality sign, and the usual logical symbols: & (and), v (or), ~ (not), ~ (implies), Vx (for all x), and 3x (there exists x), for example,
is a predicate calculus formula expressing the fact that there exist arbitrarily large primes. Such formulas have the standard meanings, which correspond exactly to the intuition; see [20] for a formal treatment.
Great effort has gone into formalizing the meanings of programs [24, 13] , but for this discussion only programs whose meanings are intuitively obvious will be used. There are two popular ways to define the meaning of a Hoare triple A (P}B; they differ in their treatments of cases where P fails to halt.
Definitions
A Hoare triple A {P} B is a true partial correctness formula if whenever the program segment P begins execution with its first command in a state for which A is true and P terminates normally by executing its last command then B is true of the resulting final state.
A{P}B is a true total correctness formula if whenever P begins execution with its first command in a state for which A is true then P terminates normally by executing its last command, and B is true of the resulting final state.
For example, A (While True do x := x end}B is always a true partial correctness formula, independently of A and B. Partial correctness formulas make no distinction between failure to terminate and abnormal or unsuccessful termination due to an error such as division by zero. The above formula is a false total correctness formula as long as there exists a state for which A is true. False(P}B is a true formula for both partial and total correctness. If P always halts when started in a state for which A is true, then the partial and total correctness meanings for A {P}B are the same. For example, x>O& v>O (z: = 1; i:= O; Whilei<ydoz:=z*x;i:=i+ 1 end} z=x y is a true formula for both partial and total correctness, roughly expressing the fact that the program inside the braces computes x to the y power. (To achieve machine independence, programs in Hoare formulas are assumed to be executed on an ideal machine with an arbitrarily large memory capacity, so that there are no overflows.) The partial correctness meaning for Hoare triples is more popular than the total correctness meaning because it is thought to be easier to deal with in formal proofs. Of course, a partial correctness proof for a program is only valuable if we convince ourselves by some other means that the program halts. In the rest of this discussion, Hoare triples will always be interpreted as partial correctness formulas unless otherwise stated.
For the Hoare language contradictory(Oh) should hold whenever some predicate calculus subset of ~b is contradictory. Also, if • is a contradictory set of predicate calculus formulas, and P is a well-formed program that obviously halts (e.g., a program with no loops), and if dp contains all the formulas True{P}A for A in ~, then is contradictory. Any additional intuitively contradictory sets of formulas may be added to the definition of contradictory(alP) without affecting the following discussion.
Proof Rules for Programs with Conditional and While
Consider a programming language with simple assignments x := E for expressions E, a command Null which does nothing, a command Fail which never terminates normally, two-branched conditionals of the form, If A then P else Q end, and loops of the form, While A do P end. Commands may be sequenced in the Pascal style with semicolon separators. Of course, Null and Fail are not needed, but they are convenient for discussion.
Assume that we have taken some sufficiently powerful proof rules from mathematical logic for all of our predicate calculus reasoning. In order to prove theorems in the form A {P}B we need additional rules for reasoning about programs. A (While B do P end)A&~B
A~B, B(P}C, C~D
Consequence:
To see that these rules are inferentially sound, we merely check each rule individually to see that whenever the hypotheses are true, the conclusion must also be true. Since combinations of inferentially sound systems are inferentially sound, we need not consider the possible interactions between rules. Cook [8] has shown that these rules are sufficiently powerful to prove all true statements in the Hoare language of conditional-while programs.
Defined Functions
Let us add to the conditional-while programming language the ability to define functions by means of subprograms. For simplicity, consider only recursionfree (i.e., noncircular) definitions of unary functions, with no nesting of defmitions, no side effects, and no global variables. Such a simple version of function definitions already provides interesting pitfalls for Hoare logic. Function definitions will be written in the form f: Function(x); local zl, .--, z~; P; return(y) end x, y, z~,...,z~ must be distinct and must contain all variables in P. n may be 0, in which case there are no local variables and the phrase local zx, • • -, zn; is omitted.
The form return(y) must occur exactly once, at the end, and should be thought of as a punctuation like Function(x) rather than a command. The value of x must not be changed in P. Any changes to the values of y, zl, • ,., za within P have no effect on the values of these variables outside of the function definition.
Clint and Hoare [6, 16] proposed the following rule: Consider the following derivation:
Predicate Calculus So, the system containing Function-1 is not even weakly consistent.
It may appear that Function-1 only derives contradictions from pathological function definitions that never halt. A similar contradiction arises whenever a defined function fails to halt for some possible argument, even if the value of the function is never computed for that argument. For example, it is very natural to define the factorial function by a program that works correctly for positive arguments, but computes forever on negative arguments. The presence of such a definition leads to a contradiction even if factorial is only computed for positive arguments.
Alagi6 and Arbib [1] present the rule Function-1 with an informal warning that the function body must halt when A is true initially. For a logical rule to be useful, we must be able to decide when the rule has been applied correctly. Alagi6 and Arbib's restriction, taken literally, cannot be formalized in an acceptable fashion, since the halting of P is undecidable. One reasonable way to fix the rule Function-1 with such a restriction is to provide means for proving termination, that is, to use a total correctness logic instead of partial correctness. Alternatively, the rule could be restricted to some decidable proper subset of the set of all function bodies which halt.
The inconsistency in Function-1 is essentially Russell's paradox [23] in disguise. Russell's paradox arises from the definition of a set R as the set of all sets which do not contain themselves. Does R contain itself?. A set may be represented by a function, called the character- istic function, that returns 1 for inputs in the set and 0 for inputs not in the set. Russell's set R is represented by the defined function r : Function(g); y := 1 -g(g); return(y); end Now, the following derivation mimics Russell's paradox:
1) 1 --g(g) = 1 --g(g)
Assignment (y := 1 -g(g))
y = 1 --g(g)
2) True ~ Predicate Calculus
1-g(g) = 1-g(g)
3) y = 1 -g(g) =*y # g(g) Arithmetic 4) True(y := 1 -g(g)} Consequence, 1),
y # g(g)
2), 3)
5) Vg(True ~ r(g) # g(g))
Function-l, 4)
6) r(r) # r(r)
Predicate Calculus,
5)
Musser [ 18, 21 ] proposed a modified function rule in Euclid notation. Musser's basic idea is that the paradox of Function-1 arises when formulas A and B are chosen in such a way that there does not exist a function f satisfying
Vx(A ~ B(f(x)/y)). The existence of such a function may easily be expressed in the first-order predicate calculus as Vx::Iy(A =0 B).
To avoid the extra step of substituting various values for x, Musser includes the substitution in his rule. Musser's rule covers recursion, a form of data abstraction, and more complicated uses of parameters, but, for the restricted function definitions of this paper, the rule is essentially
Function-2: 3y (A ( E/x) ~ B( E/x)), A (P) B (A(E/x) ~ B(E/x,f(E)/y))
where f has been defined as f: Function(x); local zl, -.., zn; P; return(y) end and A and B do not contain z~, • •., zn free.
This rule may be applied with only one choice of A and B for each function definition.
The additional hypothesis 3y (A ( E/x) ~ B( E/x)) pre-
vents the simple contradiction that arises from Function-1. Now we need two proofs to derive a contradiction. Let f again be defined by a body that never halts (*). The referee pointed out that the following rules are not even weakly consistent if nonstrict functions such as the conditional are allowed on the right-hand sides of assignments. If the expression E does not contain the variable z, the following rule may be used for reasoning about defined functions. If defined functions are used in the conditions of conditionals and loops, two more rules are required. 
A(P}B A(E/x){z :--G[f(E)]} B(E/x,f(E)/y)

A(P)B
A( E/x) & ( B( E/x, f( E)/y) ~ C( G[f( E)]/z)){z
Function-conditional:
A (P}B, C & G[f(E)] & B(f(E)/y){Q} D, C & --I G[f(E)] & B(f(E)/y){R) D A (E/x) & C{If G[f(E)}
A{P}B, C& G[f(E)]{Q}C
correctness properties of programs that only mention values of defined functions when those values have actually been computed.
Unfortunately, the Function-assignment, Functionconditional, and Function-while rules are deficient as a foundation for practical reasoning. A primary reason for defining a function within a program is to allow reasoning about the internal behavior of the function body to be done once and the results stated as a lemma that can be applied freely within the main program. The above function rules allow the reasoning about a defined function to be localized, but they do not allow the results to be stated conveniently as a lemma. Another sound set of rules for reasoning about the partial correctness of programs with defined functions was recently proposed by de Bakker, Klop, and Meyer [9] . Their rules replace each call to a defined function with the body (essentially the Algol copy rule), and thus suffer from the same practical deficiency as the rules of this paper. There appears to be no formal system known for partial correctness of defined functions that is simultaneously logically sound and convenient for representing practical reasoning.
The Goto Problem
Since the Hoare language is tailored to the description of exactly two states associated with a program execution--the normal entry and exit states--it is not surprising that trouble arises in considering program segments with more than one mode of entry and/or exit. Such multiple entry and exit segments occur when the The soundness of rules for function definitions is a slippery issue when function bodies fail, since the normal interpretation of the predicate calculus does not allow for partial functions. So, we consider a predicate calculus formula containing a program-defined function f to be true when it is true for all total functions f consistent with the values computed by the definition off [7] . If the definition fails to halt, then every total function is consistent with all the computed values (there are none), so only assertions that hold for all functions, such as Vxf(x) =f(x), are true forf. The assertion f(0) = 0 is only true when the definition off actually computes the output value 0 on input 0. Under such an interpretation and assuming that all primitive functions are strict, it is conjectured that Function-assignment, Function-conditional, and Function-while are inferentially sound. These rules are so inelegant that the proof of soundness is of much less interest than Cook's [8] proof of soundness for the system of Sec. 4.
Since the systems containing Function-1 or Function-2 are not even strongly consistent, they cannot be sound. Notice that Function-1 is an inferentially sound rule under the total correctness interpretation. For total correctness, the rules Fail and While are not sound, so alternate rules must be used for reasoning about these constructs in a total correctness logic [7, 12] .
The logical system containing the rules of Sec. 4 plus Function-assignment, Function-conditional, and Function-while cannot be relatively complete according to Cook's [8] definition, because there is no way to prove properties off(x) unlessf(x) is actually computed in the program. This system is sufficient to prove all partial where f has been defined as f: Function(x); local Zl, "'' ,'Zrt; P; return (y) end and A and B do not contain zl, • .., zn free.
These three rules may be extended in a natural way to handle more than one defined function.
Goto command is used. It is not obvious how to interpret A (P) B when P may terminate by executing Goto/, with the label l occurring outside of P. The usual solution, proposed by Donahue [13] , is to regard such termination as abnormal. So True(Goto /)False is a true partial correctness formula, and, by itself, Goto l is indistinguishable from Fail.
Under this interpretation, the Composition-1 rule is unsound. For example, True(Goto/)False and False(l: Null)False are true hypotheses for Composition-l, but the associated conclusion True(Goto 1; 1: Null)False is false, since Goto l; 1: Null is equivalent to Null. No system containing Composition-1 may be inferentially sound for reasoning about programs with Gotos. In [13] Donahue places such strong restrictions on the use of Gotos that it is syntactically impossible to have a program segment P; Q with a jump between P and Q. Composition-1 is sound for Donahue's restricted language.
Clint and Hoare [6] proposed a rule for reasoning about Gotos that may be combined with Composition-1 in a theorem sound system. To understand this rule, consider a programming language with assignment, conditional, while loops, sequencing, and Gotos that may branch out of but not into the scopes of conditionals and loops. Without loss of generality, let all labels be attached to Null commands. The Null rule must be expanded to allow labeled Null commands: The following critique also applies to Kowaltowski's variation on the Clint-Hoare Goto rule [17] . The hypothesis B(Goto/)False k A(P) B is intended to mean that A (P) B has been proved using B (Goto/)False as an assumption (similarly for B(Goto /)False k B (Q} C). The system of reasoning using the rules of Sec. 4 plus Goto-1 is theorem sound. Notice that True (Goto l} False, although true, cannot be proved with these rules, so Composition-1 cannot be used to produce True(Goto l; l: Null)False. Any extension of this system in which True(Goto l)False is provable is theorem unsound and even inconsistent.
What about the inferential soundness of the Goto-1 rule itself?. That depends on how we interpret the truth or falsehood of B (Goto/)False k A(P) B.
If we interpret this hypothesis as true only when there is a proof ofA (P) B from B (Goto/)False in the particular 933 system we are using, then the meaning of this rule depends on the whole system. For example, the rule would be sound within the Clint-Hoare system, but not in a system that proves True(Goto/)False. Clarke [5] uses this weak interpretation of t-in expressing the soundness of a rule for recursive procedures. A more robust interpretation is that B (Goto/)False k A ( P)B is true whenever there exists an inferentially sound system in which A (P) B may be proved assuming B (Goto /}False--equivalently, whenever B(Goto /)False implies A ( P} B. Donahue [13] Uses this stronger interpretation of ~-in his treatment of recursive procedures. Since B (Goto l)False is true, the implication reduces to simply A (P)B [3] . Contrary to Donahue's Theorem 5.15 [13] , the Goto-1 rule is certainly not sound in the stronger interpretation, since [3] .
Perhaps the insistence on inferential soundness and the most liberal possible interpretation of k seems too picky. After all, it seems that we only need to be careful about Gotos, which are well-known to be dangerous beasts, and avoid introducing axioms like True(Goto l) False. Unfortunately, the rule Goto-1 may yield false conclusions in the presence of added rules or axioms which do not appear to have anything to do with Gotos. The correct theorem True(x: = 1; Goto l; x: = 0; l: Nuli)x ~ 0 is also provable, so the system containing Goto-1 and Zero is not strongly consistent.
How may we reason correctly about Gotos? One way is to return to the Floyd [14] style of proof, in which a proof follows the control flow of a program. Constable and O'Donnell [7] have explored this idea. Manna and Waldinger's intermittent assertions [19] also handle Gotos easily. Even if we insist on using the Hoare language, we may still have a sound system for reasoning about Gotos. The fundamental idea in the following rule was by Alagi6 and Arbib [1] . First, Composition-1 must be replaced by Composition-2:.4 { P } B, B (Q } C ,4( e; Q}C where there are no Goto branches from P to Q or Q to P.
To understand the rest of the rules, notice that ,4 { P; Fail; l: Null} B says that if ,4 is true initially and P terminates by executing Goto l, then B is true of the fmal state. Alagi6 and Arbib [1, 3] express the same idea in the more convenient special notation {,4 } P {l: B }. Alagi6 and Arbib [1] present the Goto-2, Goto-label, and Goto-while rules in a somewhat more powerful notation. They also give the Goto-composition and Composition-I rules combined into one rule, neglecting to state the restriction that there are no jumps between P and Q. Without such a restriction, the rule becomes unsound. (In private correspondence, Arbib indicatesthat the rule was only intended to apply to a restricted form of statement, called an L-statement. Arbib and Alagir's rule is sound for L-statements. The restriction is not given explicitly in the statement of the rule.) Combination is strengthened to include one application of Composition-1. Goto-conditional is omitted in [1] . It is conjectured that the system consisting of the rules Null, Fail, Assignment, Conditional, and While from Sec. 4, along with Null-label Composition-2, Goto-2, Goto-label, Goto-composition, Goto-conditional, Goto-while and Combination above, is inferentially sound. Proof of soundness should be rather simple because of the direct way in which these rules simulate Floyd's style of reasoning on flowcharts. Cook's techniques for proving relative completeness [8] may be used to show that this system is sufficiently powerful to derive all true partial correctness formulas for our simple programming language with Gotos.
De Bruin [11] proposes an interpretation ofA { P} B under which a variant of the Clint-Hoare system is sound. B{ P} C is true with respect to a sequence of "label invariants" A1, ..., An if, whenever P is executed in a state satisfying B, either P fails to terminate or P terminates normally in a state satisfying C, or P terminates by branching to the ith label li in a state satisfying A/. Thus, B {Goto//}False is true if and only if B ~ A/. While de Bruin's technique gives a technically correct support for something very much like the Clint and Hoare Goto rule, the formal justification requires an infinite class of proof systems, one for each different choice of label invariants. Under de Bruin's interpretation, a much simpler Goto rule is the following.
Goto-3: Ai {Goto li} B
Conclusions
It has been argued that a logical system is only correct when it is inferentially sound, so that every intermediate step in a proof, as well as the final result, is true according to some intuitively meaningful notion of truth. Weaker correctness criteria such as theorem soundness, which guarantees the truth of final results but not intermediate steps, are unacceptable because they allow intuitively false reasoning that leads by formal tricks to true results. A logical system that is theorem sound but not inferentially sound is very dangerous because the addition of true axioms may introduce an inconsistency.
Rules proposed for reasoning about defined functions and Gotos in the Hoare style have not always met the standard of inferential soundness. Inferentially sound rules are not hard to find, but they are unsatisfyingly inelegant. The problem seems to be that partial correctness reasoning in the Hoare language is very natural for programs with only conditionals and loops for control structures, but not for programs with defined functions and/or Gotos. Defined functions tangle partial correctness and termination together to such an extent that it is no longer convenient to separate them. Since it is essential to prove termination anyway, we should use total correctness logics for reasoning about function definitions. Goto commands destroy the Hoare style analysis of programs by structural induction, since the semicolon does not really indicate composition in the presence of Gotos, as it does in their absence. Goto commands are handled very naturally in the Floyd style of reasoning.
